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LAWFARE AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 
Professor Orde F. Kittrie* 
The increasing legalization of international relations has made law 
an increasingly powerful alternative to traditional military means to 
achieve operational objectives. Terrorist groups and their state sponsors 
have made explicit use of such “lawfare” to achieve their operational ob-
jectives. The U.S. government’s response to law’s potential as a tool for 
advancing national security objectives has thus far been predominantly 
defensive. The United States should not only fight back hard against terror-
ists’ use of lawfare but also more vigorously look for ways to itself so use 
law. Lawfare is less deadly than traditional warfare. Also, the U.S.’s advan-
tage in sophisticated legal weapons is surely even greater than its advan-
tage in sophisticated lethal weapons. The article suggests how the United 
States could more effectively deploy some types of lawfare as a tool for 
promoting its national security objectives. It takes as a case study the uses 
and potential uses of lawfare against Iran. 
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The increasing legalization of international relations has made law 
an increasingly powerful alternative to traditional military means to achieve 
operational objectives. Major General Charles Dunlap, Jr., has famously 
coined the term ―lawfare‖ to describe the strategy of so using—or misus-
ing—law. Terrorist groups and their state sponsors have made explicit and 
sometimes effective use of lawfare to achieve their operational objectives.  
Under the Obama Administration, and especially the Bush Admin-
istration, the U.S. executive branch‘s response to law‘s potential as a tool 
for advancing military objectives has thus far been predominantly defen-
sive. This is unfortunate. If there are ways of accomplishing traditional mili-
tary objectives using law, the United States should not only fight back hard 
against terrorists‘ use of them but also vigorously look for ways to itself so 
use law. First, lawfare is less deadly than traditional warfare. Second, if 
some portion of the battle can take place in the courts rather than the battle-
field, that should be to the U.S.‘s great advantage. While the United States 
does have more sophisticated lethal weapons than those of its adversaries, 
its advantage in sophisticated legal weapons is surely even greater. Howev-
er, the U.S.‘s advantage in sophisticated legal weapons has thus far been 
underutilized.  
Part I of this article analyzes lawfare and its use by terrorists and 
their state sponsors. Part II examines the U.S. executive branch‘s defensive 
response to lawfare. Part III employs as a case study the uses thus far and 
potential future uses of lawfare against Iran, which is both the leading state 
sponsor of terrorism and the leading threat to the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime. The remarkable impact of the limited deployment of lawfare against 
Iran to date indicates that some types of lawfare, deployed systematically 
and effectively, may be able to save U.S. and foreign lives by significantly 
advancing U.S. national security objectives that would otherwise require 
kinetic warfare.1 Part IV notes that the successes of lawfare-style sanctions 
vis à vis Iran call into question the accuracy of the dominant paradigm in 
the scholarly literature regarding sanctions, which derides sanctions as inef-
fective in a globalized economy. Part IV concludes by considering lessons 
  
 1 Kinetic warfare is warfare that involves traditional weapons such as guns and bombs. 
See, e.g., Ruth Walker, Other Ways Than By (Kinetic) Warfare, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/The-Culture/The-Home-Forum/2009/0123/p18s01-
hfes.html.  
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learned and how the United States could more effectively use some types of 
lawfare as a tool for promoting its national security.  
I.  LAWFARE AND ITS USE BY TERRORISTS AND THEIR STATE SPONSORS 
In his series of influential articles on ―lawfare,‖ Major General 
Charles Dunlap, Jr., used the term lawfare to describe the ―strategy of us-
ing—or misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to 
achieve an operational objective.‖2 The concept of lawfare is extremely 
useful both for describing a particular set of distinct activities undertaken by 
enemies of the United States (and its allies), principally terrorists and their 
state sponsors, and for describing a particular set of distinct activities that 
could be undertaken by the United States to accomplish its national security 
objectives vis à vis its enemies.  
Lawfare, as practiced by enemies of the U.S., has thus far predomi-
nantly taken two interrelated forms: (1) battlefield tactics designed to gain 
advantage from the greater allegiance of the United States and its allies to 
international law—especially the international law of armed conflict—and 
its processes; and (2) the use—or misuse—of legal forums to achieve opera-
tional objectives traditionally achieved by military means.  
A. Battlefield Tactics Designed to Gain Advantage from the Other 
Side’s Greater Allegiance to International Law  
In his first major article on lawfare, published in 2001, Dunlap fo-
cused primarily on battlefield tactics designed to gain advantage from the 
U.S.‘ greater allegiance to international law and its processes, and especially 
the international law of armed conflict.3 He suggested that these tactics are 
  
 2 Charles Dunlap, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT‘L AFF. 146, 146 (2008). 
Other commentators have offered various narrower definitions. See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr. 
and Lee Casey, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2007, at A11 (―The term ‗lawfare‘ describes 
the growing use of international law claims, usually factually or legally meritless, as a tool of 
war.‖); Kenneth Anderson, ‗Lawfare’ as Illegal Behavioral Counters to Superior Military 
Forces, and the Limits of Technological Responses to It, KENNETH ANDERSON‘S L. OF WAR 
AND JUST WAR THEORY Blog (May 5, 2008, 10:09 AM), http://kennethandersonlawofwar. 
blogspot.com/2008/05/as-illegal-behavioral-counters-to.html (―One way to define ‗lawfare,‘ 
in fact, is systematic behavioral violations of the rules of war, violations of law undertaken 
and planned through advance study of the laws of war in order to predict how law-abiding 
military forces will behave and exploit their compliance; and where such violations are in-
tended as a behavioral counter to superior military forces, including superior, yet law-
compliant, technology and weapons systems.‖). 
 3 See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian 
Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Center for Human Rights, John F. Kennedy Sch. of 
Gov‘t, Harvard U., Working Paper, 2001), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ 
cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf [hereinafter Dun- 
lap, Law and Military Interventions]. 
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designed to accomplish two main goals: (1) the tactical goal of causing U.S. 
armed forces to fight with one hand tied behind their back and (2) the stra-
tegic goal of destroying the American public‘s will to fight by making it 
appear that the United States is waging war in violation of the law of armed 
conflict.4 The same enemy act can accomplish both goals. Dunlap gave as 
an example Taliban placement of military assets in or around ―noncomba-
tant facilities such as religious structures and NGO [non-governmental or-
ganization] compounds in the hopes of either deterring attacks or, if attacks 
do take place, producing collateral damage media events that serve their 
cause.‖5 Similar tactics have been adopted by other armed forces, including 
Saddam Hussein‘s Iraqi military6 and Hamas, which, as Laurie Blank notes, 
has fired from schools and residential areas ―‗in the hope that nearby civi-
lians would deter Israel from responding‘.‖7  
It has been said by some at this conference that insurgent activities 
such as firing from amongst civilians are simply a violation of the law of 
war, and do not merit their own attention, separate from that, as examples of 
one type of lawfare—the deliberate attempt to gain advantage from the oth-
er side‘s greater allegiance to international law and its processes. I disagree. 
I find particularly cynical, troubling, corrosive of international law, and 
worthy of separate study, efforts to deliberately try to gain advantage from 
one side‘s greater allegiance to international law and its processes. This is a 
type of lawfare that the United States should strongly oppose and definitely 
not seek to replicate. 
  
 4 Id. at 11–13.  
 5 Id. at 13. 
 6 See Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield, Enemy 
Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High Ground, 56 
A.F. L. REV. 1, 43–51 (2005); Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and 
Civilian Casualties in Iraq 74-76 (2003); Senior Def. Official, U.S. Dep‘t of Def., Briefing 
on Use of Human Shields in Iraq (Feb. 26, 2003), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030226-dod01.htm (―The Iraqis have regularly placed air 
defense missile systems and associated equipment in and around civilian areas, including 
parks, mosques, hospitals, hotels, crowded shopping districts, and even in cemeteries. They 
have positioned rocket launchers next to soccer stadiums that are in active use, and they‘ve 
parked operational surface-to-air missile systems in civilian industrial areas. This is a well-
organized, centrally managed effort, and its objectives are patently clear: preserve Iraq‘s 
military capabilities at any price, even though it means placing innocent civilians and Iraq‘s 
cultural and religious heritage at risk, all in violation of the fundamental principle that civi-
lians and civilian objects must be protected in wartime.‖). 
 7 Laurie R. Blank, Finding Facts But Missing the Law: The Goldstone Report, Gaza and 
Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 279, 290 (2011)(citing Goldstone report quote of inter-
view with three Palestinian militants). 
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B. Use—Or Misuse—of Legal Forums to Achieve Operational Objec-
tives Traditionally Achieved by Military Means 
Briefly in Dunlap‘s seminal 2001 article,8 and especially since, the 
concept of lawfare has also been used, in particular by other commentators, 
to describe efforts to use—or misuse—legal forums to advance operational 
objectives traditionally achieved by military means.9 This latter type of law-
fare was famously referred to in the Pentagon‘s March 2005 National De-
fense Strategy for the United States of America, which stated: ―Our strength 
as a nation will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of 
the weak, focusing on international fora, judicial processes, and terror-
ism.‖10  
Dunlap provides several examples of such efforts to manipulate le-
gal forums to advance operational objectives traditionally achieved by mili-
tary means. For instance, in Colombia, the FARC rebels discovered that one 
way of getting rid of a particularly effective government military command-
er is to accuse that commander of human rights violations. 11 This is effec-
tive because under Colombian law, the commander must then be relieved of 
command and is not eligible for military defense counsel, thus requiring 
him to spend personal funds to hire defense counsel.12  
The manipulation of legal forums to advance military objectives is 
also an explicit tactic of Hezbollah and Hamas. Hezbollah Secretary Gener-
al Sayyed Nasrallah has spoken as follows of manipulating legal forums to 
advance his military objective of defeating Israel: ―We have to sue the 
Israeli leaders anywhere possible in the world. Suing Israel for its crimes 
will render Israeli leaders beleaguered and perplexed.‖13  
Similarly, a Hamas leader recently discussed the group‘s ―policy‖ 
of seeking to have senior Israeli leaders arrested whenever they visit Euro-
pean countries.14 The Times of London reported that ―Hamas says that it 
initiated‖ a British arrest warrant issued against Tzipi Livni, who served as 
  
 8 Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions, supra note 3, at 36.  
 9 See Rivkin and Casey, supra note 2; Jeremy Rabkin, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., July 13, 
2004, at A14.  
 10 U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 5 (2005).  
 11 Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions, supra note 3, at 36.  
 12 Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions, supra note 3, at 36; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The 
Law of Armed Conflict, AFA Policy Forum, (Sept. 13, 2005), http://www.afa.org/media/ 
scripts/Dunlap_conf2005.asp. 
 13 Mohamad Shmaysani, Sayyed Nasrallah: Unite to Back Turkey, Egypt; Take Part in 
Freedom Flotilla 2, AL MANAR (June 4, 2010), http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/News 
Details.aspx?id=140626&language=ar (Al Manar is a Lebanese media outlet affiliated with 
Hezbollah).  
 14 James Hider, Hamas Using English Law to Demand Arrest of Israeli Leaders for War 
Crimes, TIMES OF LONDON (Dec. 21, 2009). 
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Foreign Minister of Israel during the 2008 war in Gaza.15 According to the 
Times, in the United Kingdom ―the campaign by Hamas takes advantage of 
an aspect of law in England and Wales that allows anyone to apply for an 
arrest warrant for alleged war crimes without the need for a prosecuting 
lawyer.‖16 As a result of the warrant, Livni, who had been scheduled to ad-
dress a meeting in London, was forced to cancel her visit.17  
Similar warrant efforts have led other Israeli leaders to cancel other 
visits to the U.K.18 Such efforts to manipulate legal forums to transform 
Israel into a pariah state seem designed to contribute to the Hezbollah and 
Hamas objectives of destroying Israel, including by distracting Israel‘s 
leaders from their duties; contributing to Israel‘s delegitimization and demo-
ralization; and reducing Israel‘s ability to conduct diplomatic relations and 
communicate effectively with foreign audiences. 
II.  THE U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH‘S DEFENSIVE RESPONSE TO LAWFARE  
Under the Obama Administration, and especially the Bush Admin-
istration, the U.S. executive branch‘s response to law‘s potential as a tool 
for advancing military objectives has thus far been predominantly defen-
sive. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense during the George W. Bush 
Administration, saw lawfare in ―personal terms,‖ expecting to be ―at the top 
of the target list,‖ according to Jack Goldsmith, who served during that ad-
ministration as Special Counsel at the Department of Defense and then As-
sistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel.19  
Rumsfeld‘s concern increased after a group of Iraqis brought uni-
versal jurisdiction criminal complaints against him and General Tommy 
Franks in a Belgian court in the spring of 2003.20 The complaints centered 
on war crimes alleged to have been committed during the invasion of Iraq.21 
After Rumsfeld threatened to move NATO headquarters out of Belgium, 
Belgium changed its universal jurisdiction law and blocked the prosecutions 
of Rumsfeld and Franks.22 However, Rumsfeld worried about both the uni-
versal jurisdiction laws that remained on the books elsewhere in Europe and 
international tribunals.23 Rumsfeld‘s concern about the latter was heigh-
  
 15 Id. 
 16 Id.; see also Richard Ford, Anyone Can Apply for a Warrant Over Allegations of a 
Serious Offence, TIMES OF LONDON (Dec. 21, 2009). 
 17 Soeren Kern, New “War Crimes” Lawfare, HUDSON NEW YORK, Aug. 4, 2010, 
http://www.hudson-ny.org/1456/new-war-crimes-lawfare. 
 18 Id. 
 19 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 59 (2007).  
 20 Id. at 60–61. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 61. 
 23 Id. 
File: Kittrie 2 Created on: 1/13/2011 7:36:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:08:00 PM 
2010] U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 399 
tened by a narrowly averted move by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia to prosecute NATO officials for bombing a Serbian 
television station and other alleged war crimes during the 1999 Kosovo 
campaign.24 
As was discussed in detail at the Lawfare! symposium, some asso-
ciated with the Bush Administration used the term ―lawfare‖ to derogatorily 
describe legal work by a human rights non-governmental organization 
(NGO) and several American attorneys defending Guantanamo detainees 
and other defendants in the war on terror.25 The unsubstantiated implication 
was that the NGO and attorneys were trying to use law to advance a tradi-
tional military objective; for example, the defeat of the United States and its 
allies.26 
The Bush Administration placed considerable weight in its legal 
policy decisions on defending the United States from lawfare. For example, 
the Administration opposed U.S. participation in the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) out of fear that those hostile to the United States might bring 
about ICC trials of American leaders or soldiers.27 The Administration also 
argued for its Guantánamo military tribunals in part on the grounds that 
standard criminal trials of al-Qaeda operatives could be manipulated by 
defense counsel to put prosecutors to a choice between revealing sensitive 
U.S. intelligence sources and methods or letting terrorists go free.28 As of 
January 2011, nearly two years into the Obama Administration, the United 
States still has not joined the ICC, and the Obama Administration has itself 
decided to use military commissions in certain circumstances.29 
  
 24 Id. 
 25 See, e.g., Jeff Breinholt, J’Accuse: Lawfare Lawyers Storming the Courts, FAMILY 
SECURITY MATTERS, Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.fsmarchives.org/article.php?id=1386307; Jeff 
Breinholt, Is Lawfare Being Abused by American Lawyers?, FINDLAW‘S WRIT, Mar. 9, 2007, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20070309_breinholt.html.  
 26 It is worth nothing that the implication may not be as far off the mark in the specific 
case of American attorney Lynne Stewart, who was convicted in 2005 by a U.S. federal 
district court of ―assisting terrorism by smuggling information from an imprisoned client to 
violent followers in Egypt.‖ John Eligon, Heftier Term for Lawyer in Terrorism Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 16, 2010, at A22.  
 27 Phillip Carter, Legal Combat: Are Enemies Waging War in Our Courts?, SLATE (Apr. 4, 
2005, 5:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2116169/; Goldsmith, supra note 19, at 61–63. 
 28 Goldsmith, supra note 19, at 109; Frederic L. Borch, III, Why Military Commissions Are 
the Proper Forum and Why Terrorists Will Have “Full and Fair” Trials: A Rebuttal to Mili-
tary Commissions: Trying American Justice, THE ARMY LAWYER 10 (2003). 
 29 Charlie Savage, Judge Delays Resumption of Guantanamo Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/us/15gitmo.html# (―Mr. Obama had been a critic 
during the presidential campaign of Mr. Bush‘s use of military commissions. But his admin-
istration eventually decided that the tribunals were necessary if certain detainees were to 
receive trials, because they offered greater flexibility than civilian courts in the admission of 
certain kinds of evidence, like hearsay and materials gathered under battlefield conditions.‖). 
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In addition, the U.S. military has, at least in part in response to law-
fare, greatly restricted its targeting (on occasion restricting itself beyond the 
requirements of international law) in order to avoid accusations of dispro-
portionate collateral damage to civilians.30 Dunlap provides an example of 
how reports about NATO airstrikes allegedly causing civilian casualties 
were responded to by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan.31 ISAF responded to reports of such deaths by proclaiming 
that NATO ―would not fire on positions if it knew there were civilians near-
by.‖32 A NATO spokesman emphasized that ―if there is the likelihood of 
even one civilian casualty, [NATO] will not strike, not even if we think 
Osama bin Laden is down there.‖33 This goes beyond the requirements of 
international law and also encourages enemy forces to surround themselves 
with innocents so as to immunize themselves from attack.34 As Dunlap so 
eloquently puts it, NATO‘s creation of restrictions beyond what is required 
by the law of armed conflict 
creates for its adversary a substitute for conventional military wea-
ponry. . . for the Taliban to survive it is not necessary for them to 
build conventional air defenses; rather, just by operating amidst ci-
vilians they enjoy a legal sanctuary . . . that is as secure as any for-
tress bristling with anti-aircraft guns.35  
So the U.S. executive branch‘s response to lawfare—law as a tool 
for advancing operational objectives traditionally achieved by military 
means—has been predominantly defensive, a response adopted originally 
by the Bush Administration but which still strongly influences the U.S. ap-
  
 30 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Visiting Professor, Duke University School of Law and Asso-
ciate Director, Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security, Presented at Case Western 
University School of Law Frederick K. Cox International Law Center War Crimes Research 
Symposium, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia? (Sept. 10, 2010), available at http://www. 
au.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/2010/0520/0520Articles/Dunlap0520.pdf (―By creating restric-
tions beyond what the law of armed conflict would require, NATO‘s pronouncements en-
courage the Taliban to shield themselves from air attack by violating the law of armed con-
flict by embedding themselves among civilians.‖). 
 31 See id. (discussing comments from Maj. John Thomas, spokesman for NATO‘s Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id.; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Op-Ed., Lawfare Amid Warfare, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, 
at A17, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/aug/03/lawfare-amid- 
warfare/?page=1 (―Establishing a paradigm of "zero tolerance" for casualties may well come 
back to haunt us in yet another way. Specifically, it encourages the enemy to do exactly what 
we do not want them to do: surround themselves with innocent civilians so as to virtually 
immunize themselves from attack. It creates a sanctuary that the bad guys are not entitled to 
enjoy, and sends them exactly the wrong message.‖). 
 35 Dunlap, supra note 30. 
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proach to the ICC and other issues. This is unfortunate, as the U.S. govern-
ment could more effectively advance its national security objectives by 
making more offensive use of lawfare. 
III.  HOW THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CAN BETTER USE LAWFARE AS A TOOL 
FOR PROMOTING NATIONAL SECURITY 
The U.S. government‘s response to lawfare should not simply be a 
defensive crouch. If there are ways of accomplishing traditionally military 
objectives using law, the United States should not only fight back hard 
against others‘ use of them but also vigorously look for ways to itself so use 
law. As Phillip Carter so eloquently put it: ―[W]e have every reason to em-
brace lawfare, for it is vastly preferable to the bloody, expensive, and de-
structive forms of warfare that ravaged the world in the 20th century.‖36  
 First, lawfare has the clear advantage of being less deadly to both comba-
tants and bystanders than is conventional warfare.37 As Carter wryly puts it, 
he ―would far prefer to have motions and discovery requests fired at [him] 
than incoming mortar or rocket-propelled grenade fire.‖38 Second, if some 
part of the fight is to take place not in the battlefields but rather the courts, 
that should be to U.S. society‘s great advantage. While the United States 
does have more sophisticated lethal weapons than its adversaries, its advan-
tage in sophisticated legal weapons is surely even greater. Thus far, the U.S. 
advantage in sophisticated legal weapons has been underutilized in the war 
on terror. The U.S. government, and perhaps even concerned U.S. attorneys 
in the private sector, could be doing far more to use law—both existing law 
and potential changes to law—as part of the fight against al-Qaeda, the Ta-
liban, the Iranian regime, and others who seek to engage in terrorist acts 
against the United States and/or acquire weapons of mass destruction. 
In order to concretely analyze how the United States could more ef-
fectively use lawfare as a tool for promoting its national security, the re-
maining sections of this article employ as a case study the uses thus far and 
potential future uses of lawfare against Iran, which is both the leading state 
sponsor of terrorism39 and the leading threat to the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime. The article will analyze, and draw more broadly applicable lessons 
from, four existing examples of where law is already being used deliberate-
  
 36 Phillip Carter, Legal Combat: Are Enemies Waging War in Our Courts?, SLATE (Apr. 4, 
2005, 5:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2116169/. 
 37 Id. (―[L]awfare rarely generates the collateral damage of conventional warfare. In recent 
war zones such as Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq, the cumulative civilian death toll stretches 
into the hundreds of thousands.‖). 
 38 Id. 
 39 OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2009 (2009), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm 
(―Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism.‖). 
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ly, systematically, and creatively to achieve operational objectives against 
Iran.  
A. The Iranian Threat to International Peace and Security 
Iran‘s nuclear weapons program, state sponsorship of terrorism, and 
human rights abuses make it a preeminent threat to international peace and 
security. In pursuing its dangerous agenda, the Iranian government egre-
giously violates international law. For example, Iran continues to violate 
U.N. Security Council resolutions ordering Iran to suspend its nuclear 
enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water related activities.40 In a series of 
periodic reports, most recently on November 23, 2010, the Director General 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency has determined again and again 
that ―contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the 
Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities‖ 
and has ―continued‖ with ―heavy water related activities.‖41  
At the same time, Iran has chosen to violate numerous other inter-
national legal obligations. Iran‘s brutal response to postelection protests 
contravened its human rights obligations under international law, including 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.42 Iran has also con-
tinued its destabilizing support for terrorist groups across the Middle East, 
including by providing them with arms in violation of U.N. Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 1701 and 1747.43  
  
 40 S.C. Res. 1737, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (2006) (Dec. 27, 2006); see also S.C. Res. 
1747, ¶¶ 12–13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (2007) (Mar. 24, 2007) (reaffirming resolution 
1737); S.C. Res. 1803, ¶¶ 1, 14, 18–19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (2008) (Mar. 3, 2008) (reaf-
firming resolutions 1737 and 1747); S.C. Res. 1929, ¶¶ 1–2, 36–37, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 
(2010) (June 9, 2010) (affirming Iran‘s non-compliance with resolutions 1737, 1747, and 
1803 and reaffirming resolution 1737). 
 41 Int‘l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] Director General, Implementation of the NPT 
Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islam-
ic Republic of Iran, at 9, IAEA Doc. GOV/2010/62 (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.iaea.org/ 
Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-62.pdf. See also, e.g., Int‘l Atomic Energy 
Agency [IAEA] Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and 
Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 11, 
IAEA Doc. GOV/2010/46 (Sept. 6, 2010), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ 
Board/2010/gov2010-46.pdf (identical language). 
 42 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52–60 (Dec. 16, 1966), available at 
www2.ohchr.org/English/law/ccpr.htm; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. 95–20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 43 For example, an Iranian ship carrying weapons from Iran to Yemeni rebels, which was 
seized by the Yemeni government on October 26, 2009, violated UN Security Council Reso-
lution 1747, which orders that ―Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly 
from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related 
materiel.‖ S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 41, ¶ 5. A second ship, carrying 500 tons of weapons 
from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which was seized by the Israeli navy on November 3, 
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B.  Overview of U.S. and International Responses to Iran 
What is the range of responses available to the United States and to 
the international community? A U.S. President‘s five key tools for altering 
the behavior of a foreign country can be alliteratively characterized as: (1) 
speaking (statements and negotiations); (2) sweeteners (incentives); (3) 
sanctions (economic and diplomatic restrictions); (4) sabotage and (5) sol-
diers (military action). In the case of Iran, speaking and sweeteners have 
been tried and failed,44 and soldiers are a very problematic option.  
The United States and its allies are reportedly focusing their efforts 
against Iran‘s nuclear program on sanctions and covert sabotage (including, 
for example, the Stuxnet computer virus).45 The combination of sanctions 
and sabotage seems, as of early January 2011, to be succeeding in signifi-
cantly slowing Iran‘s nuclear program.46 On January 10, 2011, Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton stated: ―The most recent analysis is that the sanctions 
have been working. They have made it much more difficult for Iran to pur-
  
2009, violated Resolution 1747 as well as Resolution 1701, which ordered all States to ―pre-
vent . . . the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel 
of all types.‖ See id.; S.C. Res. 1701, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (2006) (Aug. 11, 2006). 
 44 Seven days after his inauguration, President Barack Obama declared that ―if countries 
like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us.‖ Nazila 
Fathi & Alan Cowell, After Obama Overture, Iran’s Leader Seeks U.S. Apology, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 29, 2009, at A8. Over the rest of 2009, the Obama administration followed up on the 
January 27, 2009 declaration with numerous friendly gestures to the Iranian regime. The 
United States used terminology suggesting it was no longer seeking regime change, empha-
sized its disinterest in using military force against Iran‘s nuclear program, for a year stopped 
seeking significantly stronger sanctions against Iran, and offered Iran a very generous deal 
relating to its Tehran Research Reactor. However, the Iranian regime responded to Obama‘s 
outstretched hand with a clenched fist. As President Obama stated in his speech of March 20, 
2010 to the Iranian people on the occasion of Nowruz, the Iranian new-year: ―You have 
refused good faith proposals from the international community . . . . Faced with an extended 
hand, Iran‘s leaders have shown only a clenched fist.‖ THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE 
PRESS SECRETARY, REMARKS OF PRESIDENT OBAMA MARKING NOWRUZ (2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-marking-nowruz; see 
also Videotaped Remarks on the Observance of Nowruz, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
201000190 (Mar. 20, 2010), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2010/DCPD-
201000190.pdf. 
 45 David Ignatius, Buying Time with Iran, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2011, at A17 (―Stuxnet was 
just one of what appeared to have been a series of efforts to disrupt the supply chain of the 
Iranian nuclear program.‖); Isabel Kershner, Israeli Ex-Spy Predicts Delay for Iran’s Nuc-
lear Ambitions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at A8 (―The United States also has a covert pro-
gram to undermine Iran‘s nuclear program.‖). 
 46 See, e.g., Jay Solomon & Charles Levinson, Sanctions Slow Iran’s Warhead Capability, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 8-9, 2011, at A1; Ignatius, supra note 45, at A17 (―The Obama Administra-
tion has concluded that Iran‘s nuclear program has been slowed by a combination of sanc-
tions, sabotage and Iran‘s own technical troubles.‖).  
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sue its nuclear ambitions.‖47 As Washington Post Associate Editor David 
Ignatius wrote about U.S. policy towards Iran in a column in early January 
2011, ―What‘s increasingly clear is that low-key weapons—covert sabotage 
and economic sanctions—are accomplishing many of the benefits of mili-
tary action, without the costs.‖48 
While Stuxnet and other efforts to sabotage Iran‘s nuclear program 
are clearly having a significant impact, and undoubtedly raise important 
questions in the cyberlaw and other relevant legal arenas, they are not ex-
amples of using law as a tool to achieve an operational objective. In con-
trast, sanctions are a form of lawfare, as Paul Williams noted at the Law-
fare! symposium, and as Gen. Charles Dunlap discusses in the section titled 
―Lawfare as an American Weapon‖ of his article for this symposium.49 Gen. 
Dunlap provides several examples of when ―actions that could be characte-
rized as lawfare have been carried out by the United States—and properly 
so.‖50 In doing so, he offers the following outstanding example of the poten-
tial power of the sanctions type of lawfare: 
Legal ‗weaponry‘ can have effects utterly indistinguishable from 
those produced by their kinetic analogs. During the 2003 invasion, 
for example, the Iraqi air force found itself hobbled by a legal de-
vice—sanctions—as effectively as by any outcome from traditional 
aerial combat. By preventing the acquisition of new aircraft, as well 
as spare parts for the existing fleet, Iraqi airpower was so debilitated 
that not a single aircraft rose in opposition to the coalition air arma-
da.
51
 
The sanctions imposed on Iran in recent years—through U.N. Secu-
rity Council resolutions binding under international law and through 
changes to the domestic laws of the U.S., European Union, and others—
have been a particularly salient, deliberate, and, in many cases, creative 
form of lawfare. The sanctions use law as a substitute for traditional military 
means to advance an operational objective—in this case, halting Iran‘s illicit 
nuclear program.52  
  
 47 Jay Solomon, Clinton Says Curbs Slow Iran Program, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2001, at 
A10. 
 48 Ignatius, supra note 45, at A17. 
 49 Dunlap, supra note 30. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 40 (the Security Council, in the resolution‘s 
preamble, notes that the resolution is motivated in part by a determination ―to constrain 
Iran‘s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile pro-
grammes‖); Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-195, § 2 (10) (2010)(finding that ―economic sanctions to prevent Iran from 
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What are the principal means by which sanctions—economic and 
other restrictions imposed through changes to international and domestic 
law—can advance their operational objective? Sanctions can have any or all 
of several useful impacts on the target, including especially (1) coercing the 
target (in this case Iran) into halting its illegal behavior, if the costs of the 
behavior (in this case proceeding with the nuclear program or supporting 
terrorism) are increased sufficiently to outweigh the benefits to the regime 
of proceeding with the behavior; and (2) constraining the target from engag-
ing in illegal behavior, if the sanctions materially reduce the target‘s supply 
of assets necessary to engage in the behavior.53 The U.S. government‘s cur-
rent sanctions on Iran are designed to both coerce and constrain Iran.54 
Recent history shows that strong sanctions, effectively imple-
mented, can help stop illegal nuclear weapons programs and terrorism. For 
example, robust sanctions helped induce Libya to forsake terrorism and 
verifiably relinquish its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons pro-
grams.55 In exchange for the lifting of sanctions imposed by the United Na-
tions and United States, Libya halted its support for terrorism, paid $2.7 
billion to the families of the Pan Am flight 103 bombing victims, and al-
lowed a team of British and U.S. government experts to enter Libya and 
dismantle its weapons of mass destruction infrastructure.56  
  
developing nuclear weapons, are necessary to protect the essential security interests of the 
United States.‖). 
 53 Readers interested in a more detailed discussion of the goals potentially served by the 
imposition of sanctions in the international arena may wish to refer to Orde F. Kittrie, Avert-
ing Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is Losing its Deterrence Capacity 
and How to Restore It, 28 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 337, 354–61 (2007). 
 54 Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of the Treasury, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies by Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence 
Stuart Levey (Sept. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Levey remarks], available at http://www.ustreas. 
gov/press/releases/tg862.htm (Levey emphasizes two desired impacts of the Obama Admin-
istration‘s tightening sanctions on Iran. One is ―to sharpen the choice for Iran‘s leaders be-
tween integration with the international community, predicated on fulfilling their internation-
al obligations, and the hardship of further isolation.‖ Levey explains that ―[b]y dramatically 
isolating Iran financially and commercially and by capitalizing on Iran‘s existing vulnerabili-
ties, we can impact Iran‘s calculations‖ so as to ―create crucial leverage for our diplomacy.‖ 
Another desired impact is to ―make it harder for Iran to pursue international procurement for 
its nuclear and military programs.‖). 
 55 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & BARBARA 
OEGG, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 12–13 (3d ed. 2007) (―[T]he surprise decision 
by Libyan President Muammar Gadhafi in 2003 to renounce weapons of mass destruction 
was partly influenced by his desire to end the decade-old U.S. sanctions and to gain access to 
American oil field technology and know-how.‖). 
 56 The sanctions on Libya both contained Qaddafi‘s ability to develop weapons of mass 
destruction and ultimately coerced him, including by grinding down Libya‘s oil industry and 
causing economic problems so severe they threatened his grip on Libya. See Kittrie, supra 
note 53, at 406–14. 
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Unfortunately, the U.N. Security Council—thanks to Russian and 
Chinese obstructionism—has thus far imposed relatively weak sanctions on 
Iran for its proliferant activities.57 For example, the sanctions thus far im-
posed by the Security Council on Iran are significantly weaker than the 
sanctions imposed by the Council in response to many lesser threats to in-
ternational peace and security—including on Liberia during its 2003 civil 
war, Sierra Leone in response to its 1997 military coup, Yugoslavia during 
the Bosnia crisis, Haiti in response to its 1991 military coup, Libya in re-
sponse to its support for terrorism, and Iraq in response to its invasion of 
Kuwait and weapons of mass destruction programs.58  
Due to its ideology, the value to the Iranian regime of engaging in 
nuclear proliferation is particularly high.59 However, the price the interna-
tional community has exacted from the Iranian regime for its violations has 
thus far been remarkably low. Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, 
1803, and 1929 are, by themselves, too weak to coerce Iran into com-
pliance, halt Iran‘s ability to advance its nuclear weapons program, or deter 
other states from following Iran‘s lead and developing their own nuclear 
weapons program. This is unfortunate because Iran‘s heavy dependence on 
foreign trade leaves it highly vulnerable to strong economic sanctions.60 
Concerned that U.N. Security Council sanctions on Iran are insuffi-
ciently impactful, and faced with the drawbacks of a U.S. military option, 
American opponents of Iran‘s nuclear weapons program are creatively using 
law in four key ways to step up the pressure on Iran to comply with interna-
tional law and cease its enrichment and other sensitive nuclear activities: (1) 
state and local actions including pension divestment; (2) legal pressure on 
foreign banks doing business with Iran; (3) legal pressure on foreign energy 
companies supplying refined petroleum to Iran; and (4) litigation strategies. 
  
 57 See id. at 383–84, 389 (discussing Russian and Chinese blocking of strong Security 
Council sanctions on Iran). 
 58 See Orde F. Kittrie, Emboldened by Impunity: The History and Consequences of Failure 
to Enforce Iranian Violations of International Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 519, 547–48 
(2007) (comparing the strength of these sanctions imposed by the Security Council). 
 59 See id. at 543–44 (―Iranian leadership is . . . motivated by a religious conviction that 
exalts martyrdom and suffering. In comparison with a purely economic calculation, the Ira-
nian regime‘s ideology causes it to ascribe greater cost to complying with the sender‘s de-
mand to shut down the nuclear weapons program and lesser cost to any suffering that may be 
imposed by sanctions.‖). 
 60 See Kittrie, supra note 58, at 536–537 (―Iran‘s heavy dependence on oil export revenue 
and other foreign trade leaves it highly vulnerable to economic sanctions.‖); see also Kittrie, 
Using Stronger Sanctions to Increase Negotiating Leverage with Iran, ARMS CONTROL 
TODAY (Dec. 2009), at 18–21, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/3982. 
File: Kittrie 2 Created on: 1/13/2011 7:36:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:08:00 PM 
2010] U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 407 
1. State and local actions including pension divestment 
As of 2004, U.S. state and local pension funds reportedly had some 
$188 billion invested in foreign companies doing business with state spon-
sors of terrorism, including Iran.61 State and local pension fund divestment 
from such companies was seen by its proponents as having the potential to 
contribute significantly to discouraging these and other foreign companies 
from investing in, or otherwise doing business with, these state sponsors of 
terrorism.62 In addition, the threatened withdrawal from such companies of 
state and local pension fund investment was seen as providing these compa-
nies with a strong incentive to withdraw from business they were already 
doing with the state sponsors of terrorism.63 At least twenty-seven states and 
the District of Columbia have divested pension funds from companies doing 
business with Sudan, as have at least twenty-two cities.64 In addition, at 
least nineteen states and the District of Columbia have divested pension 
funds from companies investing in Iran‘s energy sector.65 In order to facili-
tate such divestment relating to Sudan, Congress passed, and President Bush 
signed into law in 2007, the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act, 
which clarifies that certain types of state and local divestment from compa-
nies doing business with Sudan are not preempted.66 Similarly, on July 1, 
2010, President Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, which clarifies that certain 
types of state and local divestment from companies doing business with Iran 
are not preempted.67 
Iran‘s opponents in the United States have also used state and local 
law in other ways to put pressure on Iran. For example, in 2007, when Min-
nesota Governor Tim Pawlenty discovered that an Indian company, Essar, 
was seeking to both invest some $1.6 billion in Minnesota and invest over 
  
 61 See Ctr. for Sec. Policy, The Terrorism Investments of the 50 States, 
DIVESTTERROR.ORG, 2 (Aug. 12, 2004), http://merln.ndu.edu/merln/mipal/reports/Divest 
Terror_Report.pdf (―The total estimated value of the stock of some 400 companies doing 
business in terrorist sponsoring states held by America‘s leading public pension systems is 
approximately $188 billion.‖). 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. 
 64 See generally Perry S. Bechky, The Politics of Divestment, in THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Tomer Broude ed., forthcoming 2010). 
 65 Id.; State-by-State Update on Iran Divestment Legislation (updated August 2010), The 
Israel Project, http://www.theisraelproject.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=hsJPK0PIJpH 
&b=689705&ct=8641297 . 
 66 Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat. 
2516. 
 67 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1313.  
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$5 billion in building a refinery in Iran, he put Essar to a choice.68 Pawlenty 
threatened to block state infrastructure subsidies and perhaps even construc-
tion permits for the Minnesota purchase unless Essar withdrew from the 
Iranian investment.69 Essar promptly withdrew from the Iranian invest-
ment.70  
In 2009, activists in Los Angeles, California put pressure on Sie-
mens, which sold communications monitoring and other equipment to the 
Iranian government, by opposing Siemens‘ efforts to supply rail cars to the 
Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority.71 In January 2010, 
Siemens announced that it would forgo new business with Iran.72 Although 
the Siemens decision to forgo new business with Iran was not as clearly tied 
to U.S. state or local pressures as was Essar‘s decision, the rail car contract 
incident provides another interesting example of how lawfare can be used at 
the state or local level.  
2. Legal pressure on foreign banks doing business with Iran73 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury has convinced more than 
eighty banks around the world, including most of the world‘s top financial 
institutions,74 to cease some or all of their business with Iran.75 The tactics 
Treasury is using were designed and first implemented under the George W. 
  
 68 See Larry Oakes, Essar Drops Plan with Iran: Steel Mill on Range is a Go, 
STARTRIBUNE.COM (Oct. 31, 2007, 8:12 PM), http://www.startribune.com/business/11245 
206.html (discussing Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty‘s statement that Essar‘s plans with 
Iran, if carried out, would jeopardize Essar‘s subsidies to operate in Minnesota). 
 69 See id. (stating that Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty had threatened to pull construc-
tion permits if Essar followed through with its plans to build an oil refinery in Iran). 
 70 See Tim Pugmire, Pawlenty Says Essar Concerns are Resolved, MPR NEWS (Oct. 31, 
2007, 5:16 PM), http://minnesota.priprod.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/10/31/ 
essargoesforward/. 
 71 See Eli Lake, Siemens Risks Losses Due to Iran Ties, WASH. TIMES (July 17, 2009, 4:45 
AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/17/siemens-risks-losses-due-to-iran-
ties/print/ (―One of the world‘s largest engineering firms, Siemens, could lose hundreds of 
millions of dollars in sales to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) 
because it sold Iran equipment used to spy on dissidents.‖). 
 72 See Eli Lake, Siemens Decides to End Deals with Iran, WASH. TIMES. (Jan. 28, 2010, 
5:01 AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/17/siemens-risks-losses-due-to-
iran-ties/print/ (stating that Siemens announced that it ―would be forgoing new business with 
Iran‖). 
 73 Readers interested in a more detailed discussion of the U.S. Treasury Department‘s 
innovative campaign to persuade banks to curtail their business with Iran may wish to refer 
to Orde F. Kittrie, New Sanctions for a New Century: Treasury’s Innovative use of Financial 
Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT‘L L. 789, 789–822 (2009), from which this discussion is adapted. 
 74 See id. at 815 (―More than 80 banks around the world, including ‗most of the world‘s 
top financial institutions,‘ have curtailed business with Iran.‖).  
 75 See Robin Wright, Stuart Levy’s War, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 2. 2008, at 31. 
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Bush administration.76 However, the Obama Administration cast a strong 
vote of confidence in them, including by taking the extraordinary decision 
to retain in place Stuart Levey, the Bush-appointed Under Secretary of the 
Treasury, who is principally known as the leading architect of these finan-
cial sanctions.77  
What is Treasury‘s rationale for pressuring foreign banks to curtail 
their business dealings with Iran? Iran utilizes the international financial 
system to advance both its nuclear program and its state sponsorship of ter-
rorism. In order to avoid suspicion and minimize the risk of detection, Iran‘s 
state-owned banks and other entities use an array of deceptive practices 
when using their global financial ties to advance Iran‘s nuclear program and 
sponsorship of terrorism. For example, Iran uses front companies and in-
termediaries to surreptitiously obtain technology and materials for its nuc-
lear and missile programs from countries that would prohibit such exports to 
Iran.78 In addition, Iranian banks ask other financial institutions to remove 
the Iranian banks‘ names when processing their transactions through the 
international financial system.79 The goal is to allow Iranian banks to remain 
undetected as they move money through the international financial system 
to pay for the Iranian government‘s nuclear and missile related purchases 
and to fund terrorism.80 
What accounts for Treasury‘s considerable success in persuading 
foreign banks to stop doing business with Iran? Treasury‘s principal innova-
tion can be described as follows: Rather than asking, e.g., the Swiss gov-
ernment to order its banks to stop doing business with Iran, the Treasury has 
gone directly to the Swiss banks. Treasury has found that its unprecedented 
direct outreach to a country‘s key private financial institutions can yield 
results much more quickly than does outreach to that same country‘s gov-
ernment, which can lack political will or the necessary authority, or may 
face cumbersome bureaucratic procedures for exercising whatever relevant 
  
 76 See, e.g., id., Kittrie supra note 73, at 815. 
 77 Paul Richter, Obama Administration Keeps Bush Official Involved with Iran Sanctions, 
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/03/world/fg-usiran3 (―The 
Obama administration has decided to retain the official who led the Bush administration‘s 
effort to squeeze Iran with economic sanctions, providing an important clue on how it in-
tends to approach the Islamic Republic.‖). 
 78 See Between Feckless and Reckless: U.S. Policy Options to Prevent a Nuclear Iran: 
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm.. on the Middle East and South Asia, and the Subcomm.. 
on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 
28 (2008) [hereinafter Glaser statement] (statement of Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Dep‘t of Treasury), 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/41849.pdf. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
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authorities it does have.81 Once some foreign private financial institutions 
decide to halt business with entities or individuals of concern, the reputa-
tional risk for others not to follow is increased, and those who have halted 
business with Iran often cooperate with the United States in putting pressure 
on those who have not yet done so.82 Other banks within the jurisdiction 
soon follow.83 Such private sector decisions can in turn make it more politi-
cally feasible for foreign governments to impose restrictions because some 
or all of the major relevant companies in their jurisdiction have already for-
gone the business.84 
What does the Treasury Department say to the foreign banks to get 
them to stop doing business with Iran? Treasury officials remind the foreign 
banks of the risks of doing even prima facie legal business with Iran.85 The 
banks with which the Treasury Department communicates are already aware 
of the prosecutions the Treasury has brought against other banks. For exam-
ple, in May 2004, the Federal Reserve fined UBS, Switzerland‘s largest 
bank, $100 million for sending U.S. dollars to Cuba, Iran, Libya, and Yu-
goslavia, and intentionally hiding the transactions by submitting false 
monthly reports to the Federal Reserve.86 In December 2005, ABN Amro 
Bank NV, a Dutch firm, was fined $80 million by U.S. federal and state 
financial regulators for actions including modification by its branch in Du-
bai of payment instructions on wire transfers, letters of credit, and checks 
issued by Iran‘s Bank Melli and a Libyan bank in order to hide their in-
volvement in the transactions and enable access to the U.S. banking sys-
tem.87 As one former Treasury official put it in 2008, the Treasury Depart-
ment‘s success in persuading foreign banks to curtail transactions with Iran 
  
 81 PRESS RELEASE, U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, REMARKS BY TREASURY SECRETARY 
PAULSON ON TARGETED FINANCIAL MEASURES TO PROTECT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY (June 
14, 2007) [hereinafter Paulson Remarks]. 
 82 See id. 
 83 See id. 
 84 Glaser statement, supra note 78, at 35. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See UBS Fined $100 Million Over Trading of Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2004, at 
C17. 
 87 Paul Blustein, Dutch Bank Fined for Iran, Libya Transactions: $80 Million Levied for 
Foreign Dealings, Money Laundering, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2005, 5:09 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/19/AR20051219018 
04.html. Between December 2001 and April 2004, ABN AMRO‘s overseas branches re-
moved or revised references to entities in which the governments of Libya and Iran had an 
interest before forwarding wire transfers, letters of credit and U.S. dollar checks to ABN 
AMRO branches in New York, NY and Chicago, IL. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, 
DEP‘T OF TREASURY, ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION (Jan. 3, 2006). 
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was due in part to those banks‘ eagerness ―to avoid being the ‗next ABN 
AMRO.‘‖88 
Such prosecutions have continued under the Obama Administration. 
In January 2009, Lloyds TSB Bank had to pay the U.S. government $350 
million in fines and forfeiture as a result of a scheme in which Lloyds al-
tered or ―stripped‖ wire-transfer information to hide the identities of Iranian 
and Sudanese clients in order to deceive American financial institutions and 
enable the clients to access the U.S. banking system.89 The stripping of 
wire-transfer information ―made it appear that the transactions originated at 
Lloyds TSB Bank‖ in the U.K. rather than in the sanctioned countries.90 
Most recently, in August 2010, Barclays PLC agreed to a $298 million set-
tlement with U.S. prosecutors in connection with allegations that it violated 
U.S. financial sanctions against countries including Iran.91 
What has been the impact on Iran of the pressure on foreign banks 
doing business with Iran? With most leading foreign banks curtailing their 
business with Iran, Iranian companies and their business partners are finding 
it difficult to arrange letters of credit, a central requirement for conducting 
trade.92 Many companies doing business in or with Iran have been forced to 
use smaller banks or go through intermediaries to arrange new letters of 
credit, adding twenty to thirty percent to their costs.93  
3. Legal pressure on foreign energy companies supplying refined pe-
troleum to Iran 
Although Iranian oil wells produce far more petroleum (crude oil) 
than Iran needs, Iran has relatively little capacity to refine that petroleum 
(turn it into gasoline and diesel fuel).94 Remarkably for a country that is 
investing so much in its nuclear programs, Iran has developed insufficient 
  
 88 Michael Jacobson, Sanctions Against Iran: A Promising Struggle, 31 WASH. Q. 69, 73 
(2008). 
 89 Chad Bray, Lloyds TSB Settles with U.S. Officials, WALL ST. J., Jan 10, 2009, at B8. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Barclays Deal with U.S. Over Trade Sanctions is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010, 
at B9. 
 92 See, e.g., Mark Trevelyan, More Companies Suspend Business with Iran, INT‘L HERALD 
TRIB., Jan. 17, 2008, at 15 (quoting a senior German banking and finance consultant as stat-
ing that ―[i]t is today impossible more or less in Europe, with a couple of exceptions, to get a 
letter of credit‖ for trade with Iran); No Letters of Credit, No Steel for Iranian Importers, say 
Traders, METAL BULLETIN WEEKLY, Sept. 13, 2010, http://www.metalbulletin.co.uk/Article/ 
2675316/No-letters-of-credit-no-steel-for-Iranian-importers-say-traders.html.  
 93 Michael Jacobson, Putting the Squeeze on Iran, THE GUARDIAN ONLINE, July 22, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/22/iran.usforeignpolicy.  
 94 U.S. ENERGY & INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS, IRAN, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/ 
Iran/Oil.html. 
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capacity to refine the petroleum it pumps out of its own soil. As a result, in 
2009, Iran imported some forty percent of the gasoline it was consuming.95  
Iran had been purchasing nearly all of this gasoline from a handful 
of foreign companies including Reliance Industries, an Indian firm.96 In 
2008, nonproliferation law experts and members of Congress began looking 
into how they might use law as a tool to pressure those companies to stop 
doing business with Iran. Newsweek put it as follows:  
An Arizona State University law professor and former State De-
partment nuclear-nonproliferation official, Orde Kittrie, discovered 
that Reliance had benefited from two U.S. Export-Import Bank loan 
guarantees totaling $900 million. Members of Congress—led by 
Democratic Rep. Brad Sherman of California and Republican Mark 
Kirk of Illinois—demanded that the Ex-Im Bank cut off U.S. tax-
payer assistance. After consulting with its high-priced Washington 
lobbying firm, BGR, Reliance quietly passed the word to members 
of Congress: it was halting all sales to Iran and would insist that its 
trading partners do the same.97 
The idea of squeezing Iran‘s gasoline supplies came to the attention 
of Presidential candidate Barack Obama. In a June 2008 speech, then-
Senator Obama said: ―We should work with Europe, Japan and the Gulf 
states to find every avenue outside the United Nations to isolate the Iranian 
regime—from cutting off loan guarantees and expanding financial sanc-
tions, to banning the export of refined petroleum to Iran.‖98 Obama repeated 
this sentiment during the presidential candidates‘ debate on Oct. 7, 2008: 
―Iran right now imports gasoline . . . if we can prevent them from importing 
the gasoline that they need . . . that starts changing their cost-benefit analy-
sis. That starts putting the squeeze on them.‖99 
After Iran‘s leadership rebuffed the Obama Administration‘s initial 
attempts to engage Iran, Congress stepped up its efforts to place legal pres-
sure on foreign energy companies supplying gasoline to Iran. In October 
2009, both houses of Congress passed, and President Obama signed into 
law, a prohibition on foreign companies selling to the U.S. government‘s 
  
 95 See, e.g., David E. Sanger, U.S. Weighs Iran Sanctions if Talks Are Rejected, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2009, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/03/world/middle 
east/03nuke.html.  
 96 Orde F. Kittrie, How to Put the Squeeze on Iran, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2008, at A19, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122654026060023113.html.  
 97 Michael Hirsh, Obama’s Enforcer, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 12, 2009, available at http://www. 
newsweek.com/2009/12/11/obama-s-enforcer.html.  
 98 Transcript: Obama‘s Speech at AIPAC, National Public Radio, June 4, 2008, http:// 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91150432.  
 99 Transcript: Second McCain, Obama Debate, CNN, Oct. 7, 2008, http://www.cnn. 
com/2008/POLITICS/10/07/presidential.debate.transcript/. 
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Strategic Petroleum Reserve if they are significantly involved in providing 
refined petroleum to Iran.100  
Then, on July 1, 2010, President Obama signed the Comprehensive 
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA).101 CISADA 
principally mandates that the President impose sanctions (up to and includ-
ing being barred from doing business in the U.S.) on any foreign company 
that does various types of business with Iran‘s energy sector, including be-
ing involved with providing gasoline to Iran.102 CISADA notably also: 
  Requires each prospective contractor submitting a federal gov-
ernment bid to certify that the contractor or a person owned or 
controlled by the contractor does not conduct any activity sanc-
tionable under a key provision of CISADA
103
 
  Prohibits most remaining trade between Iran and the United 
States
104
 
  Requires the Secretary of the Treasury to restrict the opening or 
maintaining in the United States of a correspondent or payable-
through account by a foreign financial institution if that institu-
tion knowingly engages in various types of transactions with pro-
scribed Iranian entities
105
 
  Directs the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit any person 
owned or controlled by a domestic financial institution from 
knowingly engaging in a transaction with or benefiting the Ira-
nian Revolutionary Guard Corps or its designated affiliates
106
 
  Prohibits U.S. executive agencies from entering into procurement 
contracts with entities that have exported to Iran sensitive com-
munications technology intended to be used to monitor or disrupt 
the free flow of communications to, or restrict the speech of, the 
people of Iran
107
 
  Increases criminal penalties for violations of various sanctions 
provisions
108
 
  Clarifies that certain types of state and local divestment from 
companies doing business with Iran are not preempted
109
 
  
100 Tom Doggett, U.S. Lawmakers Vote to Punish Iran’s Fuel Suppliers, REUTERS, Oct. 1, 
2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE59072H20091001; Energy and Water Develop-
ment and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-85, § 313 (2009). 
101 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-195 (2010). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at § 102. 
104 Id. at § 103(b). 
105 Id. at § 104(c). 
106 Id. at § 104(d). 
107 Id. at § 106. 
108 Id. at § 107. 
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CISADA had a significant impact on gasoline exports to Iran even 
before it was signed into law. Different companies stopped their varied 
forms of involvement in providing gasoline to Iran at different stages in the 
legislative process. For example, several companies stopped such business 
once the bill passed both houses of Congress, another company stopped 
once the conferenced legislation had been passed by both house of Con-
gress, and another stopped conducting such business with Iran a few days 
after President Obama signed the bill into law.110  
Since CISADA‘s enactment in July 2010, the Obama Administra-
tion has, with foreign companies doing business with Iran‘s energy sector, 
taken an analogous approach to the Treasury Department‘s unprecedented 
direct outreach to key foreign private financial institutions. William Burns, 
the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, put it as follows in his 
December 1, 2010 statement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs:  
[W]e have used the powerful instrument provided by CISADA‘s 
―special rule‖ to persuade major European and Asian firms, includ-
ing Shell, Statoil, ENI, Total and INPEX, to terminate or take sig-
nificant verifiable steps toward stopping potentially sanctionable ac-
tivities in Iran and provide clear assurances that they would not un-
dertake any sanctionable activities in Iran‘s energy sector in the fu-
ture. According to reliable estimates, Iran may be losing as much as 
$50-60 billion overall in potential energy investments, along with 
the critical technology and know-how that comes with them. More 
specifically, major international oil companies such as Shell, Sta-
toil, ENI, Total and INPEX have decided not to undertake any new 
activities in Iran. In addition, major fuel suppliers such as Vitol, 
Shell, Reliance, IPG, Glencore, and Trafigura have announced that 
  
109 Id. at § 202. 
110 H.R. 2194, the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act of 2009, passed the House on 
December 15, 2009. S. 2799, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Di-
vestment Act of 2009, passed the Senate on January 28, 2010. The Senate named its Iran 
sanctions legislation conferees in early March 2010, and the House named its conferees in 
late April 2010. The bill that emerged from conference, H.R. 2194, the Comprehensive Iran 
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, passed both the House and the Se-
nate on June 24, 2010. For a complete bill summary and status, see http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02194:@@@X; Swiss energy traders Vitol, Glencore and Trafigura 
publicly committed in March 2010 not to supply refined petroleum to Iran. Press Release, 
U.S. Dep‘t of State, Companies Reducing Energy-related Business with Iran, Sept. 30, 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/148458.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). The 
French energy firm Total suspended gasoline shipments to Iran a few days after the confe-
renced legislation passed both houses of Congress. Paul Sampson, Iran Sanctions Open Way 
for Chinese, INTERNATIONAL OIL DAILY, July 6, 2010. Lloyds of London announced on July 
9, 2010 that it would not insure or reinsure petroleum shipments going into Iran. Press Re-
lease, U.S. Dep‘t of State, Companies Reducing Energy-related Business with Iran, Sept. 30, 
2010, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/148458.htm. 
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they will no longer sell refined petroleum products to Iran. Invest-
ment in Iran‘s upstream oil and gas sector has dropped dramatically, 
forcing Iran to abandon liquefied natural gas projects for lack of 
foreign investment and technical expertise.111 
The ―special rule‖ contained in Section 102(g) of CISADA allows the Pres-
ident to on a case-by-case basis terminate, or not initiate, an investigation of 
certain sanctionable activities under the Act if the President certifies that the 
sanctionable entity has stopped the sanctionable activity or has ―taken sig-
nificant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity‖ and the President has 
―received reliable assurances‖ that the sanctionable entity ―will not kno-
wingly engage in [such activities] in the future.‖112 
As discussed in section B.2 of this article, the Treasury Department 
has in recent years persuaded foreign banks to stop doing business with Iran 
by directly reaching out to those foreign banks and reminding them of the 
risks of doing business with Iran, a risk exemplified by the steep fines le-
vied against banks caught conducting illicit trade with Iran. In much the 
same way, the State Department has in recent months persuaded foreign 
energy companies to stop doing business with Iran by directly reaching out 
to those foreign energy companies and advising them of the risks of doing 
business with Iran, a risk exemplified by the CISADA sanctions (on com-
panies doing business with Iran‘s energy sector), imposition of which can 
be halted if the President receives reliable assurances that the company is 
stopping such business with Iran‘s energy sector.113 In both cases, an im-
plied or explicit threat of legal action pursuant to U.S. law, delivered to the 
foreign company directly by U.S. officials, persuades the foreign company 
to stop doing business with Iran, even though such business is not prohi-
bited by the government of the country in which the foreign company is 
headquartered. 
As a result of this creative new form of lawfare, by October 2010, 
each of the companies that had, two years before, been one of the top five 
  
111 Hearing on Iran Sanctions, H. Comm. On Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. (Dec. 1, 2010) 
(written statement of William Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs), 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/bur120110.pdf. 
112 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-195, § 102 (g) (2010). 
113 See, e.g., U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, SPECIAL BRIEFING BY DEPUTY SECRETARY 
OF STATE JAMES B. STEINBERG ON IRAN SANCTIONS IMPLEMENTATION (Sept. 
30, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/d/2010/148479.htm (―[F]our major international oil com-
panies . . . have pledged to end their investments in Iran‘s energy sector . . . . These compa-
nies have provided assurances to us that they have stopped or are taking significant verifiable 
steps to stop their activity in Iran and have provided assurances not to undertake new energy-
related activity in Iran that may be sanctionable. . . . as a result, the Secretary has decided to 
use the Special Rule to avoid making a determination of sanctionability for these compa-
nies.‖). 
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suppliers of gasoline to Iran, had dropped out of supplying gasoline to 
Iran.114 The volume of gasoline imported by Iran in September 2010 was 
reportedly as much as ninety percent less than what Iran imported in months 
prior to the July 1, 2010 enactment of CISADA.115 Meanwhile, Iran‘s re-
maining gasoline suppliers have demanded higher premiums from Iran for 
their willingness to risk U.S. penalties.116 By using lawfare, the United 
States and its allies have managed to drastically reduce Iran‘s gasoline sup-
plies without intercepting a single tanker or firing a single shot. 
4. Litigation strategies 
The small cadre of private sector American attorneys who sue ter-
rorist groups and the national governments which support them are an ex-
ceptional example of the use of lawfare in the war against terrorism. These 
lawsuits have been extremely effective at times, including by bringing atten-
tion to the harm done by terrorists to Americans, using the American judi-
cial system to find facts and make determinations as to the connections be-
tween countries such as Iran and terrorist attacks by groups such as Hezbol-
lah, and putting financial pressure on terrorist-supporting states such as 
Libya and Iran. For example, the lawsuit against Libya by the American 
victims of Libya‘s bombing of Pan Am 103 was a vehicle by which Libya, 
in August 2003, formally accepted responsibility for the bombing and paid 
$2.7 billion in compensation to the victims‘ families.117  
  
114 As of November 2008, the top five suppliers of gasoline to Iran were the Swiss firm 
Vitol; the Swiss/Dutch firm Trafigura; the French firm Total; British Petroleum; and the 
Indian firm Reliance Industries. Orde F. Kittrie, How to Put the Squeeze on Iran, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 13, 2008, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122654026060023113 
.html. As of September 30, 2010, all five firms had stopped supplying gasoline to Iran. Press 
Release, U.S. Dep‘t of State, Companies Reducing Energy-related Business with Iran, Sept. 
30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/148458.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2010). 
115 Reem Shamseddine & Luke Pachymuthu, Iran Fuel Imports Dive in Sept on Sanctions-
Trade, REUTERS, Sept. 24, 2010, http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFLDE68N 
0ZF20100924 (last visited Nov. 27, 2010); Hearing on Iran Sanctions, H. Comm. On For-
eign Affairs, 111th Cong. (Dec. 1, 2010) (oral testimony of William Burns, Under Secretary 
of State for Political Affairs)(stating that Iran‘s imports of refined petroleum products were 
85 percent less in October 2010 than they were before July 2010). 
116 See, e.g., US-led Sanctions Force Iran to Pay 25pc More for Gasoline, OIL & GAS 
NEWS, Aug. 25, 2010; Samuel Ciszuk, Gasoline Import Premiums Rise Sharply Ahead of 
Tighter Sanctions for Iran, GLOBAL INSIGHT, Apr. 5, 2010. 
117 Kirit Radia & Maddy Sauer, Pan Am 103 Families Finally Compensated, ABC NEWS, 
Oct. 31, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=6158491&page=1; See also Andrea 
Koppel & Elise Labott, Libya Offers $2.7 billion Pan Am 103 Settlement, CNN, May 29, 
2002, http://articles.cnn.com/2002-05-28/us/libya.lockerbie.settlement_1_libyan-offer- 
commercial-sanctions-families-of-terror-victims?_s=PM:US. 
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Iran is already a major target of these litigators as a result of terror-
ist acts including the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon.118 
On October 23, 1983, a truck bomb struck a barracks housing U.S. Marine 
participants in the multinational peacekeeping force in Beirut, killing 241 
Marines.119 In July 1987, Iran‘s then-Minister of Revolutionary Guards, 
Mohsen Rafiqdoost, admitted that, ―both the TNT and the ideology which in 
one blast sent to hell 400 officers, NCOs, and soldiers at the Marines head-
quarters were provided by Iran.‖120 There is a broad consensus among 
Western experts that the planning of the attacks was supervised by Iran‘s 
ambassador to Syria.121 
In May 2003, in a case brought by relatives of some of the U.S. Ma-
rines who were killed, U.S. District Court Judge Royce C. Lamberth ruled 
that the Islamic Republic of Iran was responsible for the Marine barracks 
attack.122 Lamberth based his conclusion on testimony by expert witnesses, 
including a Hezbollah member who participated in the group that planned 
the attack, and a declassified National Security Agency intercept of a Sep-
tember 1983 message sent from Iranian intelligence headquarters in Tehran 
instructing the leader of Hezbollah (then known as Islamic Amal) to ―take a 
spectacular action against the United States Marines.‖123 In 2007, Lamberth 
ordered Iran to pay $2.7 billion in compensation to the victims‘ families.124 
In 2008, Lamberth‘s ruling served as the basis for the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York freezing $2 bilion in Iranian assets, held 
in a Citibank account in New York City, at the behest of an attorney for the 
victims‘ families.125 
U.S. nonproliferation officials, these private sector attorneys, and 
others are now considering how to use these civil litigation tactics, and the 
  
118 Readers interested in a more detailed discussion of Iran‘s long state sponsorship of 
terrorism and the international community‘s response may wish to refer to Orde F. Kittrie, 
Emboldened by Impunity: The History and Consequences of Failure to Enforce Iranian 
Violations of International Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 519 (2007), from which this discus-
sion is adapted. 
119 KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE PERSIAN PUZZLE: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND 
AMERICA 203 (2005). 
120 Rafiqdoost‘s comments were published in the Tehran daily Resalat on July 20, 1987. 
Ladan Boroumand & Roya Boroumand, Terror, Islam, and Democracy, 13 J. DEMOCRACY, 
5, 19 n.18 (2002). 
121 POLLACK, supra note 119, at 203.  
122 Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46, 61 (D.C. 2003).  
123 Id. at 54.  
124 Judge Fines Iran $2.65B Over 1983 Beirut Marine Barracks Bombing, Sept. 8, 2007, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,296141,00.html.  
125 Jay Solomon, U.S. Freezes $2 Billion in Iran Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2009, at A1. 
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legal precedents they have set, to go after proliferators and their suppliers.126 
Civil litigation options being considered include:  
  Lawsuits against foreign suppliers of dual-use items to Iran, for 
example for aiding and abetting Iran‘s violations of international 
nonproliferation law.
127
 One key question raised by this option is 
who, including prospective victims of an illicit Weapons of Mass 
Destruction program, could get standing to sue.
128
 
  Lawsuits based on the apparent personal involvement of senior 
Iranian leaders in Hezbollah terrorist attacks. In 2008, the Euro-
pean Union designated the current Iranian defense minister, 
Ahmed Vahidi, as ―a person linked to Iran‘s proliferation-
sensitive nuclear activities or Iran‘s development of nuclear wea-
pon delivery systems.‖
129
 Separately, an Argentinian judge has is-
sued an arrest warrant for Vahidi, who is accused by Argentina of 
having masterminded Hezbollah‘s 1994 bombing of a Jewish cul-
tural center in Argentina, which killed eighty-five people.
130
 De-
spite assistance from Interpol,
131
 Argentina has not yet succeeded 
in bringing Vahidi to justice. Perhaps civil litigation could be 
more effective in reaching Vahidi and his assets. 
  Legal actions for intellectual property theft based on the fact that 
Iran‘s nuclear program uses designs originally stolen from a Eu-
ropean company, Urenco, by A.Q. Khan, the father of the Pakis-
tani nuclear bomb.
132
  
  
126 See Elaine M. Grossman, Proliferation Watchdogs Eye Litigation to Combat Illicit 
Trafficking, Global Security Newswire, Oct. 30, 2009, at http://www.globalsecuritynewswire 
.org/gsn/nw_20091030_3540.php.  
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Yaakov Lappin, Interpol: No warrant out for Iranian defense minister. Ahmad Vahidi 
wanted by Argentina for allegedly masterminding the 1994 Buenos Aires Jewish center 
bombing, Jerusalem Post, Sept. 8, 2009, at 5. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Global Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction, A.Q. Khan, http://www.globalsecurity. 
org/wmd/world/pakistan/khan.htm. It is worth noting that efforts to criminally prosecute 
Khan for stealing the designs have thus far proven a failure. See, e.g., Chronology: A.Q. 
Khan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/world/asia/16 
chron-khan.html?_r=1 (noting that his conviction of nuclear espionage by a Dutch court was 
―overturned based on an appeal that he had not received a proper summons‖ and that Dutch 
prosecutors did not renew charges ―because of the impossibility of serving Khan a summons 
given Pakistan security.‖) Khan‘s only punishment was a period of house arrest in Pakistan. 
Joby Warrick, Nuclear Scientist A.Q. Khan is Freed from House Arrest, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 
2009, at A1. 
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It may also be possible to promote U.S. and allied national security 
objectives vis a vis Iran through action before international tribunals. For 
example: 
  It may be possible to bring an action before the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) against Iranian Defense Minister Vahidi for 
his involvement in the AMIA bombing.
133
 Alan Baker, former le-
gal adviser to the Foreign Ministry of Israel, has stated that Vahi-
di ―carried out a crime which could probably be defined as a 
crime against humanity,‖ noting that ―this has all the components 
of being a crime that is within the framework of the ICC.‖
134
 
  Various international experts have called for pursuing legal action 
against Iranian President Ahmadinejad on the basis that his calls 
for the destruction of Israel are tantamount to incitement to geno-
cide,
135
 which is prohibited by Article III (a) of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide.
136
  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The increasing legalization of international relations has made law-
fare an increasingly powerful alternative to traditional military means to 
achieve operational objectives. Terrorist groups and their state sponsors are 
seizing on this development by making explicit and sometimes effective use 
of lawfare to achieve their operational objectives.  
In contrast, the U.S. executive branch‘s response to law‘s potential 
as a tool for advancing military objectives has thus far been predominantly 
defensive. The U.S.‘s advantage in sophisticated legal weapons has thus far 
been underutilized.  
The remarkable impact of the limited deployment of lawfare against 
Iran to date indicates that lawfare, deployed systematically and effectively, 
may in some circumstances be able to save U.S. and foreign lives by signif-
  
133 Yaakov Lappin, Interpol: No warrant out for Iranian defense minister. Ahmad Vahidi 
wanted by Argentina for allegedly masterminding the 1994 Buenos Aires Jewish center 
bombing, Jerusalem Post, Sept. 8, 2009, at 5. 
134 Id. 
135 See, e.g., Irwin Cotler, Canada Must Get Serious About Iran, National Post, July 12, 
2010, at http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2010/07/12/irwin-cotler-canada-must-get- 
serious-about-iran/ (Cotler is the former Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Cana-
da); Tovah Lazaroff & Allison T. Hoffman, Lawyers Lobby Against Iran’s Incitement, Jeru-
salem Post, Oct. 9, 2008, at http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=123779; ―The 
Danger of a Nuclear, Genocidal and Rights-Violating Iran: The Responsibility to Prevent 
Petition,‖ at http://genocidepreventionnow.org/Portals/0/docs/2010-R2P_IRAN_ 
RESOLUTION.pdf.  
136 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, http:// 
www2.ohchr.org/english/law/genocide.htm. 
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icantly advancing U.S. national security objectives that would otherwise 
require traditional warfare. These successes call into question the dominant 
paradigm in the scholarly literature regarding sanctions, which derides mul-
tilateral sanctions as predominantly ineffective and unilateral sanctions as 
almost always ineffective in a globalized economy.137 Perhaps the innova-
tive types of lawfare-style sanctions described in this article represent a new 
breed of more effective sanctions than those derided in the scholarly litera-
ture. 
In light of lawfare‘s advantages over kinetic warfare, and the re-
markable impact of the limited deployment of lawfare against Iran to date, 
strong consideration should be given to broadening lawfare‘s application by 
the United States and its allies. Each of the types of lawfare identified by 
this article as being deployed against Iran in limited fashion could be repli-
cated in additional sectors and applied to additional security challenges.  
There is clearly room for much more vigorous deployment of state 
and local lawfare measures. For example, the fact that twenty-seven states 
have divested pension funds from companies doing business with Sudan 
and nineteen states have divested pension funds from companies doing 
business with Iran means there are twenty-three more states that still could 
divest from Sudan and thirty-one additional states that still could divest 
from Iran. In addition, Governor Pawlenty‘s effectiveness in putting Essar 
to a choice between investing in Minnesota and building a refinery in Iran 
means that there may be merit in putting together a comprehensive list of 
where else in the United States Iran‘s key business partners are seeking to 
invest and requesting subsidies and permits. Consideration could also be 
given to applying state and local lawfare measures to a broader set of target 
countries. 
In light of the success of the Treasury Department‘s unprecedented 
direct outreach to foreign banks and the success of the State Department‘s 
subsequent similar direct outreach to foreign energy companies doing busi-
ness with Iran, the Obama Administration, or a future administration, may 
decide to try to replicate in other sectors the willingness to use economic 
  
137 See, e.g., DANIEL DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOX: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 10 (1999)(providing numerous quotes in which ―pundits and 
policymakers have disparaged the use of sanctions in foreign policy‖ and noting that ―this 
disdain mirrors the scholarly community‘s consensus about sanctions‖); DAVID BALDWIN, 
ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 51 (1985)(describing ―the literature on economic statecraft‖ as cha-
racterized by ―the nearly universal tendency to denigrate the utility of such tools of foreign 
policy.‖) See also, e.g., Richard N. Haass, Sanctioning Madness, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec. 
1997, at 75 (―the problem with economic sanctions is that they frequently contribute little to 
American foreign policy goals while being costly and even counterproductive‖); id. at 77 
(―In a global economy, unilateral sanctions impose higher costs on American firms than on 
the target country‖); Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT‘L 
SECURITY 90–136 (1997).  
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and regulatory muscle to pursue national security objectives and the novel 
tactic of direct outreach to individual foreign private institutions. If so, for-
eign companies in exceptionally globalized, strategic, regulated and infor-
mation-rich sectors such as mobile telecommunications, the internet, and 
transportation could be next in line. Before the U.S. government takes such 
steps, it should analyze and weigh very carefully both the risk posed by 
such measures to U.S. economic and regulatory preeminence in those sec-
tors and the risk that such steps might set problematic precedents that could 
be used against the United States by current or future adversaries.138 Moves 
into additional sectors should be designed with an eye to minimizing those 
risks. 
Finally, the creative use of civil litigation and international tribunals 
to achieve U.S. national security objectives is still at an early juncture. For 
example, the application against proliferators of the types of civil litigation 
tactics and precedents deployed against state sponsors of terrorism is still 
mostly at the conceptual stage, and the efforts to bring Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad before an international tribunal for incitement to genocide 
have yet to succeed. The potential for the United States to more effectively 
use civil litigation and international tribunals to achieve national security 
objectives traditionally achieved by military means merits further study by 
scholars, private practitioners, and government officials. 
Lawfare‘s success in its limited deployment against Iran demon-
strates lawfare‘s considerable potential as a tool for advancing U.S. national 
security objectives with far less bloodshed than traditional warfare. The 
U.S.‘s advantage in sophisticated legal weapons should not remain underuti-
lized.  
  
 
  
138 For example, the United States depends heavily on Chinese purchases of American 
debt, a dependence which provides China with sig nificant leverage over the United States. 
See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, China Losing Taste for Debt from the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 
2009, at A1. 
